Nord Stream 2 as a Threat to National Interests of Poland and Ukraine by Sydoruk, Tetiana et al.
www.ssoar.info
Nord Stream 2 as a Threat to National Interests of
Poland and Ukraine
Sydoruk, Tetiana; Stepanets, Pavlo; Tymeichuk, Iryna
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Sydoruk, T., Stepanets, P., & Tymeichuk, I. (2019). Nord Stream 2 as a Threat to National Interests of Poland
and Ukraine. Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 19(3-4), 467-490. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-68455-1
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0
 
Nord Stream 2 as a Threat to National 
Interests of Poland and Ukraine 
 
TETIANA SYDORUK
* 
(National University of Ostroh Academy) 
 
PAVLO STEPANETS
** 
(National University of Ostroh Academy) 
 
IRYNA TYMEICHUK
*** 
(National University of Ostroh Academy) 
 
 
Abstract 
The article analyses Nord Stream 2 project in terms of the national interests of Poland 
and Ukraine. The authors carry out comparative analysis of risks and threats which are 
posed by the project to the national interests of both countries in economic, political and 
geopolitical spheres. The probable consequences of implementation of the Russian gas 
initiative are discussed. Scenarios of tactical and strategic steps of Poland and Ukraine 
are described. These steps would allow the countries to influence the process of Nord 
Stream 2 project implementation and, potentially, block it; as well as allow preparing 
their own energy systems to new conditions which might be formed after the launch of 
two lines of a new Russian gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the development and implementation of 
the Russian project of the northern gas pipeline, which was laid at the bottom of 
the Baltic Sea to connect Russian gas fields with the German energy market, 
have been the subject of an active discussion in the political and expert circles 
among the EU states and countries closely connected with the transportation 
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process of the Russian gas. Most attention during the discussion of the project 
has been focused on Russia's initiative impact on European politics and 
economy, its compliance with the European legislation requirements and the 
fate of transit countries and importers of Russian gas. However, despite the 
contradictory nature of the project and the ambiguous reaction of stakeholders 
in 2010, the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom and a number of European 
investors succeeded in starting the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline 
which was completed in 2012 and which launched the commercial exploitation 
of two gas lines.  
The main reason for the relatively quiet implementation of the project 
was the rigid policy of Berlin’s officials who managed to lobby Nord Stream 
within the EU. Moreover, Germany used the situation that the Third Energy 
Package (a set of legislative norms which came into force only in 2009 and 
which regulates the European gas market) was not sufficiently integrated within 
the EU and the national legislation of its member states. Therefore, the chances 
of blocking the Nord Stream project were minimized. The primary motivation 
for such Germany’s standpoint was its economic interest in the Russian project 
since the construction of the gas pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea made it 
possible to avoid gas transit through the territories of Ukraine and Poland 
(during the first decade of the 2000s, the stability of the Ukrainian direction was 
repeatedly questioned). Furthermore, the project enabled Germany not to pay 
the transit cost of imported Russian gas which was included in the price.
1
 
As of 2013, the first year when two lines of the gas pipeline worked 
during the whole calendar year, the capacity of Nord Stream did not reach the 
level of the project plan, namely 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas 
per year. They operated at the level of 43% of the project capacity.
2
 Therefore, 
the new gas line was not able to transmit a large part of Russian natural gas 
export to the EU which by the same year amounted to 161 bcm.
3
 The share of 
gas transported by Nord Stream remained at a level that did not make it possible 
to oust other regional energy lines. This factor allowed the transit countries of 
Russian gas, such as Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Belarus, not to consider the 
Russian initiative to be strategically threatening for their transit position.  
Nowadays, a completely different reaction is observed regarding the 
expansion of Russian Nord Stream into two new lines of Nord Stream 2 
                                               
1  Hannes Adomeit, “Germany, the EU, and Russia: The Conflict over Nord Stream 2,” 
Centre for European Studies, April 1, 2016, https://carleton.ca/ces/wp-
content/uploads/Adomeit-policy-brief.pdf. 
2  Gabriel Collins, “Russia’s Use of the “Energy Weapon” in Europе”, Baker Institute of 
Public Policy, July 18, 2017, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/ac785a2b/ 
BI-Brief-071817-CES_Russia1.pdf. 
3  Harald Hecking and Florian Weiser, “Impacts of Nord Stream 2 on the EU natural gas 
market,” EWI, November 12, 2017, https://www.ewi.research-scenarios.de/cms/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/EWI-1163-17-Studie-Impacts-of-Nord-Stream-2-web.compressed.pdf.  
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pipeline which will have an identical to Nord Stream capacity. The strong 
negative reaction of a number of the EU states, transit states of Russian gas and 
global gas suppliers is predominately caused by the international conditions in 
which the project is implemented. First of all, the radical changes of Russia’s 
political, economic, security and geopolitical images in the world and in the EU 
have played a crucial role. This is mainly due to the Kremlin's aggressive 
actions in Ukraine, i.e. an illegal annexation of Crimea; a military invasion of 
Donbas region; occupation of certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions by 
the Russian troops; spy scandals; cyber-attacks on strategically important 
systems of the West; and active interference in the internal affairs of the leading 
countries of the world. The new image of Russia has changed the way Nord 
Stream 2, the construction of which started in 2016,
4
 is perceived and has 
shifted it from a purely economic dimension to geopolitical. This did not 
correspond to the interests of the Russian Federation and Germany, the 
countries most interested in implementing the gas initiative. 
The economic dimension of the negative reaction of many states to Nord 
Stream 2 also remains important, as a substantial increase in the capacity of the 
northern gas pipeline threatens the current transit countries of Russian gas both 
inside and outside the EU. These threats comprise the redistribution of the 
energy market and non-lucrative for transit countries gas supply diversification 
for Europe. In addition, new international gas suppliers, including the United 
States and Qatar, are seeking to expand their energy presence in the European market 
which makes Nord Stream 2 a threatening project for their energy ambitions.
5
 
In the context of the above-mentioned, special attention should be paid to 
the analysis of the impact of Nord Stream 2 on such states as Ukraine and 
Poland. The complexity and the multi-level nature of the challenges posed by 
the Russian gas project to the interests of Kyiv and Warsaw, public consensus 
on Russia’s negative role in the international arena and friendly relations 
between the two countries explain the expediency of analysing these two states 
from the perspective of possible consequences of Nord Stream 2 implementation. 
 The research theme of Nord Stream 2 as a geopolitical, economic, 
political, security and environmental challenge to the international community 
is attracting considerable attention of scientists. This interest is stimulated by 
several factors. Firstly, the Russian Federation has significantly increased its 
foreign policy activity on the international scene. Secondly, the Kremlin has 
posed real threats to international peace and security. Balázs Sziklai, László 
Kóczy and David Csercsik have made an important contribution into the 
                                               
4  Nord Stream, accessed July 11, 2019, https://www.nord-stream.com. 
5  Rania El Gamal and Erik Knecht, “U.S. wants Qatar to challenge Russian gas in Europe - 
U.S. official,” Reuters, January 14, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-energy-
gulf/us-wants-qatar-to-challenge-russian-gas-in-europe-us-official-idUSL8N1ZE1XG.  
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scientific research of the geopolitical influence of Nord Stream 2.
6
 Using 
mathematical models, they have been able to analyse the geopolitical aspects of 
the Nord Stream 2 influence on the energy balance of power in the region. The 
geopolitical impact of the Russian energy project on the interests of Poland has 
been analysed by Łukasz Wojcieszak
7
 and Marco Giuly.
8
 Talking about the 
analysis of the geopolitical influence of Nord Stream 2 on Ukraine, we consider 
the works of Kai-Olaf Lang, Kirsten Westphal,
9
 Ariel Cohen
10
 and Pawel 
Rybacki
11
 worth mentioning. 
 A significant contribution to the study of the economic impact of Nord 
Stream 2 on Poland's national interests has been made by Harald Hecking, 
Florian Weiser,
12
 Péter Kotek, Adrienn Selei and Borbála Takácsné Toth.
13
 
They have analysed the economic challenges and threats that the project 
presents for Poland in the context of the complex economic impact of the gas 
pipeline in the European energy market. As for the economic impact of Nord 
Stream 2 on the interests of Ukraine, works of Alan Riley
14
 and Simon Pirani
15 
deserve special attention. They have examined in detail the financial and 
economic implications of the implementation of the Russian Baltic energy 
project for Ukraine. 
Research into the Nord Stream projects as a political instrument of 
influence on European states and especially on Poland has been conducted by 
                                               
6  Balázs Sziklai, László Kóczy and Dávid Csercsik, “The geopolitical impact of Nord 
Stream 2,” Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
October 14, 2018, https://www.mtakti.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/MTDP1821.pdf. 
7  Łukasz Wojcieszak, “Nord Stream 2 Pipeline. Role of German-Russian Energy Cooperation 
for Poland,” American Journal of Sociological Research 7, no 3 (2017): 85-89. 
8  Marco Giuly, “Nord Stream 2: Rule no more, but still divide,” European Policy Centre, 
June 25, 2018, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_8613_nordstream2.pdf?doc_ 
id=2010. 
9  Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal, “Nord Stream 2 – A Political and Economic 
Contextualisation,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs, March 13, 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 
contents/products/research_papers/2017RP03_lng_wep.pdf. 
10  Ariel Cohen, “Russia’s Nord Stream II Pipeline Is Ukraine's Worst Nightmare,” Forbes, 
June 18, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2018/06/18/russias-nord-stream-
ii-pipeline-is-ukraines-worst-nightmare/#556f7a0b3524.  
11  Pawel Rybacki, “Nord Stream 2: Russia’s Geopolitical Trap,” Harvard Political Review, 
January 17, 2019, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/nord-stream-2/. 
12  Hecking and Weiser, “Impacts of Nord Stream 2.” 
13  Péter Kotek, Adrienn Selei and Borbála Takácsné Toth, “The impact of the construction 
of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline on gas prices and competition,” REKK, February 24, 
2017, https://rekk.hu/downloads/academic_publications/NordStream2_REKK.pdf.  
14  Alan Riley, “Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences,” Atlantic Council, June 
20, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Nord_Stream_2_interactive.pdf. 
15  Simon Pirani, “Russian gas transit,” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, November 1, 
2018, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Russian-gas-
transit-through-Ukraine-after-2019-Insight-41.pdf. 
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Karel Beckman
16
 and Stefan Bouzarovski and Marcin Konieczny.
17
 Russia’s 
politicization of this energy project has been deeply analysed in the work 
written by Gabriel Collins
18
 as one of the most important threats to the national 
interests of Ukraine. 
Nowadays additional attention needs to be paid to studying the Nord 
Stream 2 impact on Ukraine and Poland in the context of challenges that this 
Russian energy project presents to both countries. The complexity of the 
challenges and threats posed by Nord Stream 2 to the interests of Ukraine and 
Poland; the importance of these two countries as energy sources for the EU, 
Russia and for the energy security in the region in general; and Ukraine-Poland 
partnership relations entail thorough analysis of the impact of the Russian 
energy project on two states.  
This article aims to study the Russian gas initiative in the Baltic Sea in 
terms of national interests of Poland and Ukraine. Therefore, the authors of this 
article have identified the following research objectives: to explore the impact 
of the project on the national interests of Poland and Ukraine on economic, 
political and geopolitical levels; to compare the importance of each level of this 
influence for Poland and Ukraine; to discuss the probable economic, political 
and geopolitical consequences of the project implementation for both countries; 
to predict tactical and strategic steps of Poland and Ukraine in respond to the 
challenges posed by the Russian energy project. 
The authors’ approach is based on comparative analysis of risks and 
threats which are posed by Nord Stream 2 project to the national interests of 
Poland and Ukraine in economic, political and geopolitical spheres. The 
expediency of such a comparison is determined not only by the strong historical 
ties between the two states, but also by the fact that they both adhere to the 
inadmissibility of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline construction and advocate 
diversification of energy sources, as well as energy cooperation of Poland, the 
USA and Ukraine. At the same time, it can be assumed that the different 
political, security, economic conditions and the social situation in Poland and 
Ukraine lead to some differences in the approaches of the two countries to 
assessing the consequences of Nord Stream 2 project implementation in various 
spheres. Identification of similarities or differences in the positions of Warsaw 
and Kyiv and their characteristics will allow to comprehensively analyse the 
probable threats to these countries’ national interests, which the implementation 
of this project represents. 
                                               
16  Karel Beckman, “Politics and economics clash over Nord Stream 2,” Energypost.eu, 
March 28, 2017, https://energypost.eu/14574-2. 
17  Stefan Bouzarovski and Marcin Konieczny, “Landscapes of Paradox: Public Discourses 
and Policies in Poland’s Relationship With the Nord Stream Pipeline,” Geopolitics 15 
(2010): 1-21. 
18  Collins, “Russia’s Use.” 
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Poland 
 
The standpoint of Warsaw concerning the Russian energy project has 
been clearly outlined almost since the start of the Nord Stream 2 initiative, and 
it remains unchanged. In Polish politics, there is a strong consensus on the 
assessment of the gas project, and the main political actors of Poland have 
unanimously manifested it. 
Polish President Andrzej Duda has repeatedly expressed his position 
regarding the harm and strategic negativity which is caused by the Russian gas 
initiative.
19
 This point of view corresponds to the position of the Prime Minister 
of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, who underlined the clear political course of the 
project.
20
 It is also worth mentioning that the parliament supports the Polish 
executive branch on this matter. The parliament has clearly outlined its position 
that the EU needs to intervene in the situation and block Nord Stream 2.
21
 As 
one can see, the reaction of the Polish authorities is almost unanimous, and it is 
supported by the public rejection of the Russian gas initiative. 
This standpoint of Poland is largely predetermined by the political 
monolithicity of the current Polish government, namely the domination of the 
Right and Justice Party in the Polish political system. Due to the history and the 
electorate of this political force, which is represented by the conservative part of 
Polish society, its anti-Russian rhetoric and actions are aimed at reducing the 
influence of Russia in European integration structures. This policy is a sort of 
an identification card of this political force which has severely condemned Nord 
Stream 2 on the national level and attempted to block this project with the help 
of the EU mechanisms.
22
 
The reasons for such Poland’s reaction to Nord Stream 2 should be 
considered at three levels, i.e. economic, political and geopolitical. This will 
give an opportunity to fully analyse the potential threats posed by the 
implementation of this energy project to the interests of Warsaw. 
 
Economy 
Let us regard those aspects of the Polish gas market that are threatened by 
the Nord Stream 2 launch. The data shows that the consumption of natural gas 
                                               
19  Maciej Martewicz, “Poland Waves Goodbye to Russian Gas After 74 Years,” Bloomberg, 
February 7, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-08/poland-bets-on-
lng-norwegian-gas-as-divorce-with-russia-looms. 
20  Martewicz, “Poland Waves Goodbye.” 
21  Marcin Czekanski, “Nord Stream 2 will hinder competition – Polish MP,” Montel, 
September 19, 2018, https://www.montelnews.com/en/story/nord-stream-2-will-hinder-
competition--polish-mp/936208. 
22  Bartłomiej Czetowicz, “Zaremba o Nord Stream 2: ‘to jest sowietyzacja prawa unijnego’,” Radio 
Szczecin, November 26, 2018, http://radioszczecin.pl/1,380838,zaremba-o-nord-stream-2-
to-jest-sowietyzacja-pra&s=1&si=1&sp=1. 
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in Poland in 2017 was 19.1 bcm per year;
23
 26% of it was from Poland’s own 
gas production. While 63% of Poland’s natural gas consumption was imported 
from the Russian Federation, and only 11% of natural gas was provided as a 
result of diversification policies, namely via a liquefied natural gas terminal 
(LNG-terminal) in Świnoujście in Northern Poland which was put into 
operation in 2015.
24
 Not only was such dependence of Poland on Russian gas 
imports predetermined by the needs of the Polish economy and the limited 
choice of suppliers (due to the lack of the necessary communications 
infrastructure with the Norwegian, American and Middle Eastern natural energy 
markets) but it was also caused by the requirements of the 1997 agreement on 
Poland’s purchase of Russian gas. The contract, signed between Gazprom and 
the Polish gas company PGNiG, was extended in 2010. Under this agreement, 
Poland was obliged to import at least 8 bcm of gas per year, and since 2011 it 
had to import 11 bcm of gas annually. This agreement will be in force until 
2022, but in November 2019 PGNiG informed Russian Gazprom about the 
contract termination of December 31, 2022, confirming Warsaw’s strategic 
decision to refuse Russian imports of gas.
25
 
Moreover, a transit contract between Poland and Russia expires in May 
2020, and the Polish government is already emphasising a revision of tariff 
policy regarding the price increase of the Russian gas transit in Europe. It 
should be underlined that, despite the refusal to import gas, Poland does not 
consider the option of completely stopping the transit of Russian gas through its 
territory because Polish politics understands the threats to Europe’s energy 
security if gas transit through the Yamal-Europe pipeline is terminated.
26
  
Therefore, in the context of the expiration of the agreements and the 
development of an alternative gas route to Western European markets, Poland 
has faced a threat of being outside the gas pipelines between the EU and Russia 
and hence of losing one of the key components of its energy importance in the 
European market. It should be noted that the loss of the transit role does not 
threaten Poland in the short term since Russia scheduled the launch of Nord 
Stream 2 only to mid-2020.
27
 Moreover, given the complexity of this process, 
                                               
23  Martewicz, “Poland Waves Goodbye.” 
24  Ibid. 
25  Marcin Czekanski, “Poland will not extend 9bcm gas supply deal with Russia,” Montel, 
November 15, 2019, https://www.montelnews.com/en/story/poland-will-not-extend-
9bcm-gas-supply-deal-with-russia/1060225. 
26  “Poland plans to increase the tariff for Russian gas transit”, Kosatka.Media, August 15, 
2019, https://kosatka.media/en/category/gaz/news/polsha-planiruet-povysit-tarif-za-tranzi 
t-rossiyskogo-gaza. 
27  Dmitrieva Anastasia, “Russia expects to delay Nord Stream 2 launch to mid-2020: report,” 
S&P Global, 21 November, 2019, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-
insights/latest-news/natural-gas/112119-russia-expects-to-delay-nord-stream-2-launch-to-
mid-2020-report. 
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the real commercial use of the two lines of the new gas pipeline can only begin 
in 2020-2021; therefore, this factor forces Moscow to adhere to a transit 
agreement with Poland. Nowadays the Kremlin via Gazprom does not regard 
the Polish transit route as strategic and has plans to redirect significant gas 
flows through Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 the total capacity of which under 
the condition of maximum withdrawal will be close to 110 bcm per year. 
According to the data of 2017, European states imported 192 bcm of gas from 
Russia (81% of it was purchased by Western European countries).
28
 Taking into 
account the project capacity of the northern gas pipeline, with the launch of 
Nord Stream 2 the Kremlin will claim that the Baltic pipeline system will be 
able to take over more than 50% of all deliveries of Russian natural gas to 
Western Europe. 
Thus, the strategic value of the Polish transit route has significantly 
decreased, and this threatens the Polish energy sector with significant financial 
losses and the need to find new sources of profit. This allows reaching an 
interim conclusion that the transit of Russian gas as a key component of 
Poland’s energy importance in the European market is under the strategic threat 
from the Nord Stream 2 launch. This additional alternative gas pipeline does not 
depend on transit through the territories of other states and therefore does not 
impose a series of transit gas surcharges for end users; and as a result, it is more 
economically lucrative. In such conditions, diverting the gas flow from the 
classical route through Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and Slovakia to the northern 
direction does not only promote the interests of the Russian Federation but also 
of importers in Western Europe. 
Another important aspect of the negative impact of Nord Stream 2 on the 
Polish economy is the decline in the state’s export capacity, caused by new gas 
conditions. Poland has declared the policy of diversification of gas supplies that 
resulted in signing contracts with gas companies of the USA, Qatar, Norway. 
Moreover, Warsaw has joined the implementation of the Baltic Pipe Project 
which should connect Poland and Denmark with the gas deposits of Norway.
29
 
Nevertheless, despite these facts, the complete refusal from Russian gas in the 
near future should not be expected. This is because Poland cannot quickly 
reduce the dependence of Polish economy upon natural gas volumes. 
In the conditions of (1) the expiration of the agreement on the import of 
Russian gas, (2) the construction of Nord Stream 2, (3) the presence of 
significant gas demand on western and eastern borders of Poland which is 
potentially capable of partially satisfying, and (4) a low level of its own gas 
production, Warsaw is interested in the re-export of natural gas. The situation 
was also facilitated by the fact that in 2017 the Russian Federation, at the 
                                               
28  “Delivery statistics”, Gazprom export, accessed December 20, 2019, http://www.gazpromexport.ru/ 
en/statistics/ 
29  Tom Dichristopher, “Poland's goal of ditching Russian natural gas bolsters American 
LNG and Trump's energy agenda,” CNBC, December 19, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/12/19/polands-goal-of-ditching-russian-gas-yields-opportunity-for-us-lng.html. 
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request of the European Commission, agreed to lift the restrictions on the re-
export of its own gas in the European market which allowed many importing 
states to become exporters and economically benefit from this.
30
 
Nord Stream 2 in this context creates significant obstacles for Poland to 
pursue its interests because the transit of gas to Germany via the Baltic pipeline 
will allow the latter to become a state with the best re-export potential. The gas 
purchased in Russia will be free of transit surcharges, and thus not only will the 
Federal Republic of Germany have an opportunity to import cheaper gas but also 
to create better competitive re-export positions in the European market (especially 
in Western Europe). Firstly, Germany beneficially uses the capacity of an onshore 
part of Nord Stream Pipeline OPAL which runs through Germany and connects 
the Northern Gas Corridor with the markets of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Secondly, it is building a new gas pipeline EUGAL which will also run through 
Germany and increase the supply to European countries. Therefore, Berlin will be 
able to become an extremely influential player in the European market and will 
significantly reduce the capacity of other EU states as gas re-exporters.
31
 
One should not forget that Russia holds the right to choose the best transit 
options for gas supply and thus to put pressure on European countries. 
Therefore, several conditions influence Poland’s policy. On the one hand, 
Germany has been a prior direction for delivering Russian gas to the EU states. 
On the other hand, the Kremlin has developed its energy sector in the south of 
Europe through the implementation of the TurkStream project. Thus, under 
these conditions, Poland faces a dilemma to minimize damage from the 
reduction of transit through its territory and also appears to be in a tight intra-
European competitive environment, in which it will be extremely difficult to 
become a gas hub. 
 
 
Politics 
 
From the beginning of the Nord Stream 2 project discussion, the Polish 
politicians, experts and the public have repeatedly stated that the most important 
vector of the Russian gas initiative is the political one. The Polish society has 
regarded and continues to regard the political side of the project from the 
perspective of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy on the international scene. 
Especially this concerns Russian actions in Ukraine since Ukraine’s geographic 
vicinity to Poland, deep and strong economic ties between these neighbouring 
                                               
30  Алексей Топалов, “«Газпром» помирился с Европой,” (Alexey Topalov, “Gazprom 
Reconciled with Europe”), Gazeta.ru, March 13, 2017, https://www.gazeta.ru/business/ 
2017/03/13/10574423.shtml. 
31  Agata Łoskot-Strachota and Pawel Popławski, “The EUGAL project: the German branch 
of Nord Stream 2,” OSW, June 15, 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ 
analyses/2016-06-15/eugal-project-german-branch-nord-stream-2. 
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states, employment of a large number of Ukrainians in Poland and close 
dialogues between two societies make Ukraine a priority for Polish foreign 
policy. Consequently, the threats to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty are also a challenge to the national security of Poland.  
In this context, the Polish side has repeatedly emphasized that the Nord 
Stream project is a continuation of the strategy of hybrid warfare which Russia 
wages not only on Ukraine but on the world in general. Thus, Warsaw wants to 
shift the emphasis in the European political discourse concerning the Russian 
initiative. Poland does not view Nord Stream as a purely economic project (the 
Federal Republic of Germany actively promotes this idea in an effort to 
commercialize Nord Stream 2) but rather as a politicised by Russia project 
which this country seeks to use as an instrument of pressure on the EU and 
especially on particular member states of the economic bloc.
32
 
Keeping this in mind, Warsaw understands Moscow’s efforts to influence 
the EU and its member states and to formalize the split inside the bloc. 
Therefore, the Polish side has repeatedly emphasized that the Russian energy 
project is also an attempt to deepen the solidarity crisis within the Union. 
According to Polish officials, the project has added the energy problem to 
existing in the EU problems of migration, Brexit and the violation of democratic 
principles in a number of European states.
33
 
It is worth noting that in Poland Nord Stream 2, or more precisely its 
business style and the specifics of this project implementation, is actively 
discussed as the Kremlin’s attempt to seriously hit the regulatory framework of 
the energy sector of the EU, i.e. the Third Energy Package. During the 
implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project, a number of the EU states have 
questioned the effectiveness of the Third Energy Package. Warsaw mostly 
criticises Brussels for its inability to use the Regulations of the Third Energy 
Package to block Nord Stream 2. By this, it is meant that an exporter of gas has 
no right to control the stage of gas transportation, whereas in the case of Nord 
Stream 2 the operator of the gas pipeline is Nord Stream 2 AG which is directly 
controlled and managed by the Russian state-owned enterprise Gazprom.
34
 
Despite the repeated attempts made by Warsaw to use the European 
bureaucratic mechanism to influence the development of the project in the 
Baltic Sea, Poland still cannot move the case along mainly because of Berlin’s 
opposition. This aspect demonstrates yet another political dimension of the 
threat that Nord Stream 2 poses to the interests of Poland, namely the 
ineffectiveness of European institutions to shape common energy policy. Hence, 
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the further political dominance of the largest EU political players and of their 
interests over the European rules continues. This cannot be in the interests of 
Poland which considers the EU mechanisms to be an opportunity to increase its 
own influence in the alliance and to prevent the domination of Berlin and Paris 
in Europe. 
The problem of Nord Stream 2 in the context of the conflict between 
Warsaw and Brussels over judicial reform in Poland, which has been harshly 
criticized by Poland’s European partners and the EU institutions, gains 
additional political importance. Being aware of the lack of alternatives to the 
European direction and realising how important it is to maintain effective and 
productive interactions within the bloc, Poland has made concessions to 
Brussels on the judicial system. This action has one more time demonstrated the 
significance of the EU for the interests of the Eastern European state.
35
 In such 
circumstances, it becomes clear that the unity and power of European 
institutions are crucial elements in the development of Poland. Therefore, 
actions aimed at preserving solidarity in the EU are a major priority for the 
Polish side. Understanding the threats presented by Nord Stream 2 to the unity 
of the EU and the ability of Russia to manipulate this issue and to use gas as a 
means of pressure, Warsaw must do its utmost to stop the project which at a 
strategic level undermines the foundations of the European unity. 
Thus, the political vector of Poland's standpoint regarding Nord Stream 2 
is no less important than the economic one because (1) the Russian energy 
project in the context of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in Europe, (2) the 
serious internal contradictions within the EU and (3) complicated relations 
between Warsaw and Moscow as well as with Brussels present a threat to the 
political stability of the EU and a number of its neighbours.  
 
 
Geopolitics 
 
Considering the geopolitical aspect of Nord Stream 2 for the national 
interests of Poland, we divide the geopolitical role of Warsaw into two vectors: 
energy competition with Germany; promotion of the energy interests of large 
gas states in the European market. 
On the subject of the first one, it is worth starting with an analysis of 
Germany’s energy macro indicators of the implementation of Russian energy 
projects in the Baltic Sea. In particular, consuming 90.2 bcm of gas in 2017, 
Germany imported from Russia’s Gazprom about 53.4 bcm of gas.
36
 This 
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indicates that Russia de facto controls more than a half of gas supplies to 
Germany and is a leading energy player in the domestic German market. It is 
necessary to underline that exports to Germany make up about 27.5% of 
Russia's total gas exports to other countries which makes Germany the highest 
energy priority for Russia.
37
 As noted above, the project capacity of the two 
lines of Nord Stream is approximately 55 bcm per year (this gas pipeline 
worked with the maximum capacity for the first time in 2018),
38
 and this gas 
pipeline alone is able to meet the domestic demand of Germany in Russian gas. 
The fact allows claiming that by the means of Germany the Nord Stream 2 
project aims to reach a larger energy scene, thereby transforming Germany into 
an influential transit country and a potential re-exporter of Russian gas in the 
European market.  
Such an energy deal between Moscow and Berlin is a serious challenge to 
Poland which seeks to preserve its status as one of the main transit countries of 
Russian gas to Europe and potentially to be an influential player in the 
European natural gas re-export market. The emergence of Germany in the EU 
energy market dramatically changes the energy balance of forces in the region. 
In fact, ten years ago, Germany was completely dependent on the transit of gas 
through the territory of Poland, Ukraine and Belarus, and this imposed an 
additional financial burden on it. Poland took advantage of the situation since it 
understood that it was one of the few keys to the European gas market. 
Additional problems are created by the implementation of the TurkStream 
project by Russia and Turkey because it creates alternative ways of supplying 
Russian gas to the southern part of the EU.
39
 
These conditions which are still at the stage of strategic formation induce 
Poland to work on strengthening another aspect of the country’s geopolitical 
role in the European and world energy markets, namely to search for new 
energy allies interested in using Poland as an energy hub and an access point to 
the EU gas market.  
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Understanding why in the geo-energy sphere Russia chose Germany as 
its main ally in the EU and as the key energy partner in the European energy 
market, Poland, pursuing its ambitions, has begun to develop the necessary 
infrastructure which would allow transforming and redirecting its own market 
from the Russian direction to others. The greatest emphasis has been put on the 
implementation of two infrastructure projects: 1) the construction of an LNG 
terminal in the Baltic region; 2) the development of the Baltic Pipe Project. 
Regarding the first one, a practical step was taken in 2015 when Prime 
Minister of Poland Beata Maria Szydło opened the LNG terminal in 
Świnoujście on the Baltic coast of the country. In future, the initial project 
capacity of 5 bcm is planned to be gradually increased by 2.5 bcm per year. 
This fact proves that Warsaw has strategic interests to actively use the terminal 
in Polish energy policy.
40
 Moreover, Poland has provided powerful energy 
reinforcement of the initiative when Warsaw signed of contracts for the supply 
of liquefied natural gas with gas companies in the United States, Norway and 
Qatar which are the largest energy players in the world. Thus, Warsaw seeks to 
diversify its gas supplies, thereby reducing its dependence on Russian gas, and 
to be able to present the energy interests of the aforementioned states. In 
particular, Poland’s role in maintaining the strategic interests of the leading 
energy countries of the world has been confirmed by US Secretary of Energy 
Rick Perry during his business trip to Poland. Moreover, the US delegation has 
stated that Poland and its LNG project should become an alternative to the 
Russian gas pipeline and reduce Europe’s dependence on Gazprom.
41
  
Thus, as it can be seen, Warsaw implements the project on a terminal for 
liquefied natural gas reception, plans a significant increase in its capacities and 
concludes relevant long-term gas supply agreements with leading energy 
countries (the United States, Qatar and Norway). In this way, Warsaw seeks to 
fill the energy vacuum that may arise because of Russia and Germany’s 
implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project which qualitatively changes the 
energy balance of forces in the European gas market. 
Such ambitions and plans of Poland are supported by the largest gas 
countries in the world. One of them is the United States which has been cut off 
from the European energy market for a long time due to Russia’s dominance 
and its own unwillingness to come on geographically distant and economically 
risky markets. Meanwhile, the attitude of the EU and most of its member states 
towards the policy of the Russian Federation has sharply deteriorated; 
moreover, Europeans have recognised Nord Stream 2 as a powerful geopolitical 
component of the Kremlin’s interests. These aspects have created favourable 
political conditions for new energy players to penetrate into the European gas 
market. The factor that the EU senior officials and the EU members regard the 
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Russian gas project as a political one enables the USA, Qatar and Norway to 
minimize some of the economic negativity which is represented by the prospect 
of a wide supply of gas from these countries to Europe, namely the high price 
and complex logistics of the process. 
The development of the plan to build the Baltic Pipe is another important 
infrastructure project which Poland considers to be a key one in its strategy to 
turn the country into a powerful energy hub in Europe and to minimize the 
damage to Poland’s interests caused by the launch of two new lines of Nord 
Stream 2. The launch of this project was announced in 2018, and it aims to 
connect Poland and Denmark with the Norwegian gas fields. The expected 
capacity of 10 bcm of gas per year will allow Poland to substantially increase 
Norwegian gas imports and potentially act as a transit country or a re-exporter 
of this gas to the European market.
42
 Thus, once again Warsaw confirms its 
desire to go into a powerful competition with Germany which is a Russian 
power hub in Europe (Germany may become one after the launch of Nord 
Stream 2). Warsaw can become a hub when it constructs an alternative gas 
pipeline that could be used by other leading global gas suppliers to enter the EU 
energy market. 
Summing up the geopolitical aspect of Nord Stream’s influence on 
Poland's interests, we should stress that Polish officials almost immediately and 
preventively began to implement the strategy of rapid diversification of gas 
supplies to the state through the development of infrastructure and logistic 
routes for gas delivery. Poland is aware of strategic risks from the 
implementation of the Russian gas initiative which could potentially reduce 
Poland’s role in transiting Russian gas. The country realises that there emerges 
a strong rival in the face of the Federal Republic of Germany and that the 
redistribution of the European gas market will not happen according to 
Warsaw’s scenario. Thus, the Polish side clearly demonstrates that it does not 
renounce the idea of gaining the status of a powerful gas hub in Europe. 
However, Russia’s choice of Germany as the main partner in the EU in gas 
supply makes Warsaw reorient and search for new gas suppliers for itself and 
for the European market among other leading gas companies in the world. 
 
 
Ukraine 
 
Ukraine, like Poland, has adopted a clear stance on Nord Stream 2 almost 
immediately after the Russian Federation announced its plans to implement this 
project. In particular, Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko has repeatedly 
emphasized that there exists a political motivation of the Russian energy 
project. He has been calling it a Trojan horse in European and world security. In 
addition, the President regards the Nord Stream 2 project and the fact that 
                                               
42  Elliott and Leech, “Nord Stream natural gas.” 
Nord Stream 2 as a Threat to National Interests of Poland and Ukraine 481 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIX  no. 3 & 4 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gazprom deliberately does not abide by the decisions of the Arbitration Institute 
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce on gas contracts between Ukraine and 
Russia as evidence of Russia’s politicization of energy policy.
43
 
A similar view has been expressed by Prime Minister of Ukraine 
Volodymyr Groysman who has repeatedly stated that Moscow uses this gas 
project as “a form of a disguised war of the Russian Federation against Europe” 
and as “geopolitical weapon of Russia.”
44
 He has emphasized that Nord 
Stream 2 is far from an exclusively economic initiative and is, above all, a 
political instrument of the Kremlin’s influence on European states.
45
 
The unity of the political elite of Ukraine regarding the Russian-led Baltic 
project has been promoted by a resolution adopted by the parliament of 
Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada. In the resolution, Ukraine called on foreign 
parliaments, governments and business communities not to participate in 
financing, preparation of, or lobbying for the construction of Nord Stream 2 
pipeline since Ukraine sees its implementation as an attempt to establish an 
absolute monopoly of Moscow in the gas market in Europe.
46
 
The election of President Zelenskyi and the reformation of the Ukrainian 
Parliament in 2019 did not change the approach of the Ukrainian authorities to the 
valuation of Nord Stream 2. In particular, in October 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyi 
stated that the Russian gas transportation project is “geopolitical” and “is 
strengthening Russia” and “weakening Europe”.
47
 This demonstrates the political 
inheritance of Ukraine's assessment of this energy issue at the present stage. 
It should also be emphasized that the severe condemnation of this project 
comes not only from the politicians of Ukraine but also from the majority of 
Ukrainian society. Under conditions of Russia’s military aggression and 
continuous provocations of the Kremlin, Ukrainians consider Nord Stream 2 to 
be another element of the hybrid war strategy which Russia uses against 
Ukraine. Thus, from the perspective of the Ukrainian society, the political and 
security aspects of this project dominate in Russia's gas initiative and push the 
economic aspect to the background. 
The reasons for such Ukraine’s reaction to Nord Stream 2, as in the case 
of Poland, are explained at various levels. However, in contrast to Poland, in the 
situation with Ukraine, there is a somewhat different priority of these levels: 
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political, geopolitical and economic. This is predetermined by the different from 
Poland political, security, economic and general social situation in Ukraine. 
 
 
Politics 
 
An assessment of the political dimension of Ukraine's national interests, 
to which Nord Stream 2 represents the greatest threat, is impossible without 
understanding of the current internal and external political situation in Ukraine. 
The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and as a result its occupation which 
continues to this day, Russia’s military incursion into Donbas and repeated 
armed provocations have formed a clear understanding of the northern 
neighbour as an enemy and a state that is waging war against Ukraine. Thus, 
Ukrainian society regards any foreign political activity of the Kremlin as a 
potential attempt to attack the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence 
of Ukraine. This immediately transforms Russia into an entity that poses a 
threat to the basic principles of existence of the country and therefore to the 
interests of the highest priority such as the security of the state and its citizens. 
Under such conditions, Russia’s announcement about the launch of the 
Nord Stream 2 project and the subsequent start of the construction of the gas 
pipeline have caused a reaction of indignation and harsh condemnation in 
Ukraine. The desire of Moscow to increase its energy influence in Europe has 
been perceived by Ukrainian society as another attempt to expand Russia’s 
aggression on the international scene and to occupy the EU energy sphere. Such 
a reaction has been especially acute because Kyiv considers the EU to be an 
important ally in the fight against Russian aggression. This is due to the fact that 
since the beginning of the aggressive actions of Moscow in Ukraine, the EU and 
its member states have repeatedly confirmed their support for the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. Moreover, they have provided financial, 
economic, diplomatic assistance to the country and actively participated in 
attempts to restrain the Russian Federation by introducing against it a number of 
personal and sectoral sanctions. Thus, Russia’s attempt to penetrate the energy 
sphere of the EU has been perceived by Kyiv as a way to destabilize the main 
ally, to break the unity within the bloc, thereby weakening the international 
support for Ukraine.
48
 
In addition, in the political consciousness of Ukrainian society, Nord 
Stream 2 poses a threat to the unity of European states concerning prolonging 
sanction pressure on the Russian Federation. Kyiv considers the EU sanction 
regime on Russia to be one of the basic and most effective methods of deterring 
Russia since it prevents the expansion of Russian aggression in Ukraine and 
strategically influences Russia's geopolitical capacity to continue the aggressive 
                                               
48  Victor Hvozd, “Nord Stream 2” Project Prospects and Risks for Inventors,” Borysfen 
Intel, September 18, 2018, http://bintel.com.ua/en/article/blog09_18_2/.  
Nord Stream 2 as a Threat to National Interests of Poland and Ukraine 483 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIX  no. 3 & 4 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
policy. Kyiv regards Nord Stream 2 as the Kremlin’s attempt to use the energy 
lever of pressure on some European states in order to force them to abandon 
sanctions policy. It is worth noting that a consensus in the EU is needed to 
prolong or extend sanction pressure on the Russian Federation. This fact allows 
Moscow to have considerable hopes for its energy direction since it can 
potentially allow Russia to influence a country or a number of EU member 
states, thereby blocking the strategy of sanction pressure on the Russian Federation.
49
 
Moreover, another reason for Ukraine to worry is the fact that Russia’s 
main partner in Nord Stream 2 construction is Germany, the political leaders of 
which continue to insist on a primarily commercial role of the project. This 
factor represents a serious threat to the national interests of Ukraine because 
Germany, i.e. chancellor Angela Merkel remains one of the largest protectors of 
Ukraine in the EU and one of the leaders who supports Ukraine in its attempts 
to restore the territorial integrity and sovereignty by returning temporarily 
occupied territories. In the context of an increase of Moscow’s energy influence 
on Berlin, which is an inevitable consequence of the Nord Stream 2 project, 
there exists a serious threat that Russia will transform its energy influence on 
Germany into political pressure which in its turn will strengthen the pro-Russian 
political elites within Germany. Besides, because of the political importance of 
Germany in the EU, this pressure may change the EU’s agenda for economic 
and financial sanctions against Russia.
50
 
Consequently, analysing the threats posed by Nord Stream 2 to the 
political dimension of Ukraine's national interests, one should realise that in 
public’s perception Russia is Ukraine’s enemy, and further Kyiv’s assessment 
of Russia's actions on the international scene is based precisely on this primary 
ideological foundation. Kyiv is also aware that Nord Stream 2 is not only an 
attempt to sow discord within the European Union and therefore break the 
consensus of the European states regarding the need to maintain current 
sanctions against the Russian Federation but also an effort to directly influence 
the main political player of the bloc, i.e. Germany. 
 
 
Geopolitics 
 
The geopolitical aspect of the Nord Stream 2 impact on Ukraine’s 
national interests has much in common with the above-analysed Polish case, in 
particular the important role of the United States. Washington’s attempt to go to 
the European energy market and strict foreign policy of Presidents Barack 
Obama and Donald Trump on the Russian Federation, namely the imposition of 
sanctions, political diplomatic pressure and military strengthening of the 
countries bordering Russia, have become the factors which make the United 
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States actively react to the beginning of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 project 
implementation. However, for Ukraine and its interests, the important thing in 
the confrontation between Washington and Moscow is that US interests 
regarding Nord Stream 2 do not always coincide with the interests of European 
states and thus create an additional point of tension in the relations among the 
Western states. As a result of the Nord Stream 2 implementation and Donald 
Trump becoming the President of the USA, there have appeared other 
problematic aspects in relations between the EU and the United States, e.g. the 
issue of NATO funding, trade disputes, the climate question and a number of 
others. Kyiv has worried, and not without grounds, that the set of these 
problems could provoke deterioration in relations within the anti-Russian 
coalition of the Western countries which de facto was formed after Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and the military invasion of Donbas.
51
 
Ukraine has been even more concerned about the fact that the US 
authorities have expressed readiness and intention to impose sanctions against 
European companies participating in the Nord Stream 2 project, causing a 
negative reaction in the EU and among its member states. Moreover, at the end 
of 2019, the US reaffirmed its intention to hinder the implementation of the 
Russian gas transportation project by imposing sanctions on companies 
involved in Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines construction.
52
 Despite the 
fact that a significant part of Ukrainian society and politics support 
Washington's desire to halt the implementation of the Russian gas project, those 
threats that are created by a potential imposition of US sanctions on the 
European companies cannot but bother Ukraine. Those threats form the 
geopolitical aspect that affects the national interests of Ukraine.
53
 
Another important geopolitical issue which poses a serious challenge to 
Ukraine’s strategic interests in terms of its probable accession to the EU and 
NATO is the use of this energy initiative by Moscow as an element of an 
overall strategy of political fragmentation of the EU. It should be emphasized 
that this is referred not only to the internal political discussions which this 
project provokes in Germany but also to Russia's pan-European tactics for 
interfering in countries’ internal affairs. The intervention is made by means of 
the financial support of pro-Russian forces or forces aimed at destabilizing the 
EU using cyberattacks and information resources as zones of its own influence 
and manipulation. These have been noticed in a number of European countries, 
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in particular Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany and others. Thus, the Nord 
Stream 2 project is another instrument in the Russian arsenal of influence on the 
internal political situation within the EU and in some member states. Seeing 
Nord Stream 2 a serious challenge to the unity of the European Union, Ukraine 
has repeatedly warned the EU about the scenario according to which Russia 
uses gas as a lever of influence.
54
 
It is impossible to analyse the geopolitical influence of Nord Stream 2 in 
Ukraine without taking into account Russia's concurrent implementation of the 
TurkStream project which connects Russia with the southern EU member states 
and uses Turkey as a transit area for a gas pipeline. The beginning of its 
construction in 2017 and the continuation of the project implementation at the 
present stage are clearly correlated with the Nord Stream 2 project. Therefore, 
these two gas pipelines become links in the same energy chain designed to 
diversify Russia’s gas supplies to Europe, thereby reducing dependence on 
Ukrainian transit, which today remains a priority both for the gas exporter and 
for European buyers.
55
 Due to the fact that the project capacity of the two 
branches of TurkStream is planned at the level of 31.5 bcm of gas per year
56 
and 
that the total capacity of the two Nord Stream projects should be 110 bcm of gas 
per year, it necessary to understand that the Ukrainian gas transportation system 
(GTS) receives two powerful energy rivals. With an aggregate capacity of 
almost 142 bcm of gas per year, TurkStream and two Nord Stream projects 
reach the level of the transmission capacity in the European market as the 
Ukrainian GTS which at the European border has the capacity of 142.5 bcm of 
gas per year.
57
 Thus, the construction of Nord Stream 2, the concurrent 
implementation of the TurkStream project and the maximum capacity of Nord 
Stream, which was achieved in 2018, pose a threat to geopolitical importance of 
Ukraine which has been seen as a long-term non-alternative transit route for 
Russia’s gas to the EU states. 
The geopolitical danger from the simultaneous implementation of Nord 
Stream 2 and TurkStream projects has been increased by the fact that in early 
2018 the Russian Federation announced the launch of the termination process of 
the agreement on Russian gas transit through the territory of Ukraine. In such a 
way, Russia created legal conditions for redirecting large volumes of gas to 
other transit highways, especially to the south and north directions.
58
 The 
Russian Federation is not able to abandon gas transit through Ukraine 
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completely (which was confirmed by the signing of a new 5-year transit 
agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation at the end of 2019)
59
 
because approximately 45% of all European gas imports from Russia in 2017 
were transported through Ukraine’s territory.
60
 Moreover, the North-South Gas 
Corridors are not ready to be used. Therefore, in the near future Ukraine is 
hardly expected to lose its geopolitical status as a powerful energy player. 
Nevertheless, under these circumstances, the strategic prospects for the 
Ukrainian GTS are disappointing. 
Thus, it should be emphasized that not only do the geopolitical risks 
posed by Nord Stream 2 to the interests of Ukraine influence the energy sector, 
they also affect the strength and solidity of the pro-Ukrainian coalition with the 
Western countries. Moreover, the risks affect the unity of the EU which is the 
main partner of Ukraine in reforming and struggling with Russian aggression on 
the Ukrainian territory. Furthermore, the geopolitical aspect of Nord Stream 2 is 
amplified by the fact that Moscow concurrently implements another gas transit 
project that goes around Ukraine, thereby reducing the strategic value of 
Ukraine for the EU member states. 
 
 
Economy 
  
Despite the fact that in Ukrainian political and expert discourse Nord 
Stream 2 is predominantly regarded as a threat at political and geopolitical 
levels, the economic aspect of the project remains extremely important. In order 
to assess the economic impact of the Russian energy project on Ukrainian 
national interests qualitatively, it is necessary to understand the energy 
importance of Ukraine to Russia and to the importing countries of Russian gas 
in the EU. 
The main element of the strategic value of Ukraine as an energy player is 
its transit role. In particular, in 2017, 93.5 bcm of the gas for European states 
were transported by the Ukrainian gas transportation system,
61
 while in general 
in 2017 Russian Gazprom exported 192.2 bcm of gas to Europe. Thus, using its 
own GTS, Ukraine transited almost half of Russia's gas exports to the EU. This 
suggests that from the economic point of view Ukraine is the most important 
transit route for Russian gas to Europe. In terms of value and load capacity, 
Ukraine outperforms the transit capacity of the Belarusian direction, i.e. the 
Yamal-Europe pipeline, and the Baltic Nord Stream project. 
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Moreover, since the end of 2015, Ukraine has not been buying natural gas 
from the Russian Federation, thereby increasing its value as a transit country of 
Russian gas. This is due to the fact that when Ukraine was buying Russian gas 
and transiting it to European buyers, Moscow was able to affect the transit role 
of Ukraine and did not allow Kyiv to use its influence.
62
 
Construction of Nord Stream 2, which will have a project capacity of 55 
bcm of gas per year and which will become a serious increase of the existing 
Nord Stream pipeline with an identical capacity, creates an opportunity for 
Moscow to substantially export the gas through the northern route, thus 
depriving Ukraine of significant volumes of transited gas. In particular, the 
Ministry of Finance of Ukraine calculated that the country could lose 2.5-3% of 
GDP if Nord Stream 2 is to be put into operation.
63
 
According to the top management of the oil and gas company Naftogaz 
of Ukraine, the northern gas pipeline project may cause serious damage in 
Ukraine. In particular, CEO of Naftogaz Andriy Kobolyev believes that losses 
can reach $ 3 billion, thereby creating a high impact on the balance of payments 
of Ukraine and on the stability of the national currency.
64
  
Furthermore, in 2017 the company Naftogaz which transits Russian gas 
to the European market received a profit of almost $ 1.3 billion from the transit 
of gas from Russia.
65
 Therefore, even the partial loss of gas volumes transported 
by the Ukrainian gas transit system can lead to a significant deterioration in the 
financial situation of Naftogaz and provoke the state monopoly to raise the 
prices for natural gas for Ukrainian consumers. Thus, Nord Stream 2 has the 
potential to become a socio-economic threat to Ukraine. 
Another important economic aspect is the need to modernize the Ukrainian 
GTS in conditions when the Russian Federation can potentially redirect significant 
volumes of transit to the northern and southern directions. Without the necessary 
loading of the gas transportation system of Ukraine which may result from the 
reduction of Russian gas transit, Ukraine could face a problem of a technological 
and infrastructural decline of its own energy power. 
Naftogaz and Ukrtransgas propose to implement a 10-year plan to 
modernize the Ukrainian GTS. In fact, these companies are allowed to partially 
privatize the system with the help of domestic and foreign investors as an option 
to amortize the damage to the GTS from changes in the European energy 
market. Inter alia, such a move is due to Russia’s energy plans to bypass 
Ukraine and lower its strategic energy value for Europe.
66
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Since 2014, attempting to improve the economic attractiveness of the 
Ukrainian GTS for European partners, Kyiv has been proposing the EU to 
change the format of Russian gas imports by purchasing gas on the Ukrainian-
Russian border. This transfers the transit talk from the EU-Ukraine-Russia 
triangle into a dialogue between Ukraine and the EU. This approach in the 
context of Russia's open aggression against Ukraine is politically and 
economically beneficial for Kyiv because it allows Gazprom to put an end to 
Russian blackmail. To date, Moscow continues to oppose such an option 
because it sees it as an attempt to deprive the Kremlin of its influence on 
Ukraine.
67
 
Thus, it should be emphasized that the economic aspect of the influence 
of Nord Stream 2 on the national interests of Ukraine is significant. In this 
context, it is important to realize that simultaneous implementation of North-
South Gas Corridor project by Russia poses a threat to Ukraine's status of the 
main transit country of Russian gas to Europe. Moreover, a decrease in transit 
volumes can provoke serious socio-economic changes in the country which may 
result in disastrous political transformations in it as well as in permanent socio-
political turbulence. Despite a number of Ukraine’s proposals for amortization 
of the damage from Nord Stream 2, Moscow is still able to block Kyiv’s 
attempts to change the format of transit relations with Russia. This situation, if 
the gas transit contract is rescinded, poses a complex threat to the Ukrainian 
economy. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Many European countries, transit states and global energy players consider 
the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project by the Russian Federation to be a 
challenge that needs to be faced. However, not so many countries perceive the gas 
initiative of the Kremlin as a potential threat to their own national interests. Ukraine 
and Poland are the two countries for which Gazprom’s challenge, i.e. Nord 
Stream 2, due to its complexity, has become a threat not only to economic security 
but also to political and geopolitical interests. 
At the economic level, Nord Stream 2 is a cause for serious concern of 
Ukraine and Poland because these countries may lose their transit roles in the 
European energy market. Being among the main transit countries of Russian gas 
to the European market, Ukraine and Poland regard the increase of the Northern 
Gas Corridor as a potential instrument of the Russian Federation to reduce the 
transit importance of these two states by means of diversifying gas supplies to 
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Europe. This situation threatens the countries with significant financial losses 
and deterioration of their strategic energy position. 
In addition, for Poland, the issue of Nord Stream 2 is particularly acute 
due to the potential loss of the ability to become a powerful re-exporter of gas in 
the EU. The emergence of such a powerful competitor as Germany will allow 
the latter to significantly expand its energy impact on the European market and 
offer better competitive opportunities for gas buyers than Poland which is 
importing expensive gas from Norway, the USA and Qatar. Concerning 
Ukraine, the threat is not so significant since the refusal to import natural gas 
from Russia and the conditions in gas contracts with Russia, which prohibit 
Ukraine to re-export Russian gas, actually deprived Ukraine of the opportunity 
to be a re-exporter of natural gas and become a significant player in the 
European market gas. 
At the political level, the threat of Nord Stream 2 is considered in the context 
of Russia's aggressive policy on the international scene during the last five years. 
Thus, Poland and Ukraine perceive Nord Stream 2 as an instrument of Russia’s 
pressure on the EU and as another strategy element of its hybrid warfare. 
Warsaw and Kyiv agree that the Russian energy project in the Baltic Sea 
is an attempt to split the European community and the pro-Ukrainian coalition 
in the West. Therefore, both countries seek to change the way the Europeans 
regard Nord Stream 2, i.e. from purely commercial to political perception that 
best demonstrates the essence of the Russian project. 
As for the geopolitical level, it is important to emphasize that the 
implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project and the simultaneous construction 
of TurkStream threaten the common ambitions of Ukraine and Poland. The 
desire to be powerful energy players in the European market, i.e. to transit and 
potentially re-export (in the case of Poland) gas, conflicts with Russia's plans to 
bypass the territory of Poland and Ukraine and use other gas pipelines. 
In this context, both countries count on the United States because Kyiv 
and Warsaw see it not only as a state that is capable of influencing and 
potentially blocking the Nord Stream 2 project but also as an energy player that 
can create an alternative to the Russian gas pipeline. In the case of Ukraine, one 
should also regard Ukraine’s attempt to prevent Moscow from using the Nord 
Stream 2 project as a way to create an artificial conflict between the United 
States and the EU states, in particular Germany. Thus, the global significance of 
the Nord Stream 2 project is so important at the economic and political levels 
and the number of actors involved in the discussion about the suitability and 
security of the project is so considerable that the geopolitical aspect of the 
impact of the gas initiative on the interests of Poland and Ukraine is critically 
important. 
Ukraine and Poland are aware of the level of threats and challenges 
presented by Nord Stream 2 to their interests. Therefore, these two countries 
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need to develop tactics and strategies to counteract the implementation of the 
project and to concurrently adapt their own energy systems to the new 
configuration of the European energy market. In this context, it is necessary to 
identify potential tactical measures which can be implemented by Poland and 
Ukraine to prevent the Nord Stream 2 launch: 
- to use legal and regulatory mechanisms of the EU, in particular the Third 
Energy Package, as a means of legal influence on the process of the Nord 
Stream 2 construction; 
- to strengthen diplomatic relations between Ukraine, Poland and the USA 
which should be aimed at encouraging more active policy of Washington to 
stop the Russian energy project; 
- to continue conducting the information campaign among the EU states in 
order to persuade the public that the project is deeply politicized and poses 
significant risks to the security and stability of European democracies; 
- to offer European partners alternative gas supply plans that could attract 
investors and potentially force them to deprioritize Nord Stream 2. 
At the strategic level, Ukraine and Poland should prepare for new 
conditions of the international energy market which can appear after the launch 
of Nord Stream 2. In this context, both counties should adopt a number of 
measures that could undermine the damage caused by the northern gas pipeline 
to their interests, namely: 
- to modernise the old and construct new energy infrastructure that would allow 
diversification of gas supplies to Poland and Ukraine and potentially use it to 
get into larger markets; 
- to develop own natural gas deposits and reorient the consumer market to 
domestic gas which will allow these countries to become independent of 
Russia’s influence; 
- to search for new partners among the world's largest energy players as an 
opportunity to receive natural gas by alternative means and as a way to 
influence the Russian Federation and potentially weaken it in the European 
energy market. 
Thus, the common threats and challenges that Nord Stream 2 poses to the 
interests of Poland and Ukraine logically require a joint position of these states 
regarding the project. Not only do they need to coordinate efforts to block the 
project implementation but also to further develop the region’s energy security 
which is based on the principle of reducing the EU’s dependence on Russia's 
gas lobby. 
